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Access to credit is crucial for business growth, and
particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). Two mechanisms are widely utilized in
economies around the world to channel credit to the
SME sector: (i) market-based financing facilitated
through secured transactions frameworks, and (ii)
government-supported financing through public
guarantee schemes. Secured transactions frameworks
reduce credit risk by providing the lender with the
right to apply the proceeds of the collateral in priority
over other creditors. Public guarantee schemes
undertake to pay a percentage of the owed amount to
the lender upon default of the borrower. The different
nature of these protections offers lenders distinct
incentives to engage in each type of credit transaction.
Guarantee schemes are a viable countercyclical mechanism to
address the economic fallout from extraordinary events, including
COVID-19. However, their effectiveness during ordinary times has
been questioned. While quantitatively such schemes enable a large
swath of enterprises to access credit at low rates, qualitatively they
channel funds to unproductive borrowers, prolong the existence of
SMEs that should be liquidated, and disadvantage ineligible
enterprises. In proportion to gross domestic product, Japanese SMEs
are the largest users of guarantee schemes in the world. OECD and
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IMF studies found that public guarantees result in weak profitability,
low productivity, and high leverage. At the same time, they disincentivize financial institutions from investing in credit screening,
valuation, and monitoring techniques necessary to deploy marketbased financing products.
This article identifies the negative effects of the Japanese
guarantee scheme and advocates for modifications to aid the
development of market-based financing. It suggests elimination of
the incentives for both the financial institutions and borrowers to
continuously utilize this form of government-supported financing
that sustains zombie companies. Several recommendations are made
to induce participating financial institutions to develop expertise in
the valuation, monitoring, and disposal of collateral, so as to pave the
way for a transition of viable borrowers to market-based financing.
However, this transition requires a modern secured transactions legal
regime that Japan presently lacks. This article contributes to the
research and policy debates undertaken within several on-going
projects that seek to modernize the Japanese legal framework to
facilitate secured transactions.
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INTRODUCTION

It has been said that the contribution of financial markets to
economic growth is “almost too obvious for serious discussion.” 1
Financial markets are composed of multiple elements that channel
credit to the economy. This article focuses on the types of financial
market instruments through which small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) access credit. The obviousness of the statement
about the contribution of financial markets to economic growth is put
to a test in examining the credit market for SMEs in Japan.
Because of their broad role in the economy, SME
development is key to productivity and inclusive growth.2 As the
engine for SME development and economic growth overall, access to
credit is crucial.3 Establishing an environment that enables access to
credit entails developing a modern credit infrastructure, introducing
innovative credit products, removing barriers to financial services,
and formalizing SMEs for inclusion in the formal sector. 4 This

1

Merton H. Miller, Financial Markets and Economic Growth, 11 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 14 (1998). See also Ben R. Craig et al., Credit Market
Failure Intervention: Do Government Sponsored Small Business Credit Programs
Enrich Poorer Areas?, 30 SMALL BUS. ECON. 345 (2008) (“economic growth and
financial market development tend to be positively correlated”). But see Robert
E. Lucas Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY
ECON. 3, 6 (1988) (expressing a contrasting viewpoint that the importance of
financial markets is “very badly over-stressed”).
2
See Angel Gurría, 2018 OECD SME Ministerial Conference, ORG. FOR
ECON. COOP. & DEV (OECD) (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.oecd.org/social/oecdsme-ministerial-conference-mexico-2018.htm [https://perma.cc/9C2Y-87Q8] ]
(“SEMs are key to strengthening productivity”); INT’L. FIN. CORP., MSME
FINANCE GAP: ASSESSMENT OF THE SHORTFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN
FINANCING MICRO, SMALL, AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS, at
1 (2017) (“[Micro, small, and medium enterprises] in emerging markets are widely
believed to be the engine of growth.”).
3
See INT’L. FIN. CORP. (IFC), SECURED TRANSACTIONS, COLLATERAL
REGISTRIES AND MOVABLE ASSET-BASED FINANCING KNOWLEDGE GUIDE, at 4
(Nov. 2019) (stating that greater access to credit would generate positive impact on
producitivity and economic growth).
4
See Id.
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infrastructure is composed of private law, regulatory rules, and
various practical aspects that need to be adequately coordinated.5
Business growth and entrepreneurship are important for
economic development. 6 Several factors affect the prospect of
business growth, fostering innovation and entrepreneurship.
Restricted access to credit is consistently found to be a major
impediment for SMEs.7 SMEs face higher transactional costs due to
their opaqueness and lack of adequate collateral.8 In Japan, more
than 99% of all businesses are SMEs, providing more than 70% of
private sector jobs.9 Availability of credit, its duration or cost is not

5
See Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Credit Creation:
Reconciling Legal and Regulatory Incentives, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63
(2018) [hereinafter Castellano & Duvobec, Credit Creation] (discussing the
necessity of coordinating between legal and regulatory standards to promote
access to credit); Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Global Regulatory
Standards and Secured Transactions Law Reforms: At the Crossroad Between
Access to Credit and Financial Stability, 41 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 531, 532 (2018)
[hereinafter Castellano & Dubovec, Global Regulatory Standards] (“Oscillating
between the need of expanding credit creation to promote economic growth and
the urgency of controlling the excessive accumulation of debt, modern economies
depend on private law rules and regulatory provisions that originate in different
fora of the international lawmaking arena.”); Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek
Dubovec, Bridging the Gap: The Regulatory Dimension of Secured Transactions
Law Reforms, 22 UNIF. L. REV. 663 (2017) [hereinafter Castellano & Dubovec,
Bridging the Gap] (“The lack of coordination between secured transactions law
and capital requirements generates tensions in the legal framework governing
extension of credit secued by movable assets.”).
6
Thorsten Beck, Bank Financing for SMEs—Lessons From the Literature,
225 NAT’L. INST. ECON. REV. 23, 34 (2013).
7
Id. at 25.
8
Pietro Calice, Assessing Implementation of the Principles for Public
Credit Guarantees for SMEs: A Global Survey 5 (World Bank Grp. (WBG), Pol’y
Rsch. Working Paper No. 7753, 2016),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/24834/Assessing0i
mpl0Es000a0global0survey.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
[https://perma.cc/2UYP-ZH8G].
9
Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2019: An OECD Scoreboard, OECD
PUBLISHING, at 143 (Apr. 12, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1787/fin_sme_ent-2019-en
[https://perma.cc/7FDN-Z8DN] (citing 2014 statistics). See also Mariana
Colacelli & Gee Hee Hong, Productivity Drag from Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises in Japan, INT’L MONETARY FUND (IMF), at 3 (2019) (citing that
SMEs more than 70% of Japan’s total work force) .
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however a problem in Japan.10 Its nature and the channel through
which it is extended are problematic, dampening growth and
preserving zombie companies.11
A market failure, such as the lack of information on borrowers
may result in inefficient allocation of credit.12 Such a failure may
then become an economic justification for a government-sponsored
lending or guarantee program. 13 Various state interventions have
been implemented across jurisdictions to prop up SME financing.
These include co-financing or risk-mitigation facilities, such as
guarantee schemes, direct lending programs, facilities for the
pledging of SME loans as collateral against refinancing from the
central bank, tax and interest rate subsidies. 14 Some of these
interventions originated as countercyclical measures, but gradually
became entrenched. 15 The case for deploying a particular
intervention, including a guarantee scheme to address the failure of
inadequate access to credit instead of some other intervention has not
been made.16
Market-based and government-supported financing are the
two main credit access channels for SMEs. The former is facilitated
by secured transactions frameworks and the latter through public
guarantee schemes. Both mechanisms reduce the credit risk of
10

See FIN. STABILITY BD., EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORMS ON SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISE (SME)
FINANCING 12–13 (2019) [hereinafter FSB, EVALUATION] (showing that three
quarters of all Japanese SME loans have maturity over one year and an interest
rate of around 1%).
11
In a 2019 report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that
“the overly generous public guarantee schemes in Japan reduce the incentives for
non-viable businesses to exit, contributing to the survival of inefficient, small and
old enterprises.” Colacelli & Hong, supra note 9, at 8.
12
Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 409 (1981).
13
See Craig et al., supra note 1, at 345, 348 (“The economic justification for
any government-sponsored small business lending program or loan guarantee
program must rest on a generally acknowledged failure of the private sector to
allocate loans efficiently.”).
14
FSB, EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 2. For a discussion of preferential
interest rates, see António Antunes et al., The Effects of Credit Subsidies on
Development, 58 ECON. THEORY 1 (2015).
15
FSB, EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 2.
16
AUGUSTO DE LA TORRE ET AL., INNOVATIVE EXPERIENCES IN ACCESS TO
FINANCE: MARKET-FRIENDLY ROLES FOR THE VISIBLE HAND? 196 (2017).
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lenders, including non-recovery and insolvency, but in different
ways. 17 Market-based financing products provide the lender with
access to an asset (collateral) that may be disposed of upon default of
the borrower with priority over other creditors of the same borrower.
Government-supported financing reduces the risk of the lender by
payment of a percentage of the owed amount upon default of the
borrower, whether or not collateral has been taken by the lender. The
different nature of the credit risk mitigant also affects the behavior of
lenders and borrowers differently.
Inefficient legal frameworks for secured transactions may be
a justification for the heavy reliance on public credit guarantees.18 If
guarantee schemes are established or supported with the objective of
addressing market failure, they should be structured to lead to the
establishment of market-based financing.
Such a structure
presupposes building lender capacity, generating relevant data on the
collateral, and aiding regulatory compliance.19
The use of collateral increases borrowers’ incentives to
conduct commercial activities in a manner that maximizes revenues.
This is because the provision of collateral shifts the risk of losses to
the borrower, enhancing motivation to repay the loan. In contrast, a
guaranteed loan that is not secured with any assets provides less
motivation to repay the loan. This is especially the case where the
culture, reinforced by the guarantee scheme design, dis-incentivizes
termination of the lending relationship. In Japan, borrowers are rarely
forced into insolvency or their assets liquidated.20 Instead, financial
institutions restructure the loan, with support from the guarantee
scheme, preserving the existence of a zombie company. This
negatively affects the company, its healthy competitors, causing
17

See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting out of
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1217 (2005)
(arguing that security interests enable shifting of the insolvency risk onto other
creditors).
18
DE LA TORRE ET AL., supra note 16.
19
See Castellano & Dubovec, Bridging the Gap, supra note 5; U.S. AGENCY
FOR INT’L. DEV., FROM LAWS TO LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN
ACHIEVING THE PROMISE OF SECURED LENDING REFORMS 37 (2018) [hereinafter
USAID, FROM LAWS TO LOANS] (“[G]uarantees should be scoped to work in
unison with other programs and policies to encourage lending practices that help
move both lenders and individual borrowers off guarantees over time, enabling
the redirection of remaining resources to new customers and needs.”).
20
See infra Section III(0).
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distortions in the overall market.21 A study of Japanese firms that
used guaranteed loans concluded that:
Generous guarantees likely helped firms that had
fundamental difficulties but did not conduct serious
restructurings, so-called “Zombie” firms, to remain
alive. The existence of Zombies decreases the
efficiency of the economy. . . . The Japanese
government must hurry to rebuild a credit guarantee
system that makes clear whom it should support, and
encourages firms and banks to make an effort to
increase efficiency and competitiveness.22
The impact of guarantee schemes on secured lending has been
studied globally, 23 including in Japan. 24 In some economies, the
schemes have been popular finance mechanisms and considered the
most effective government support program for SME lending. 25
However, an assessment of sixty credit guarantee schemes in fiftyfour countries, twenty-two of which were high-income economies,
including Japan, confirmed that improperly designed schemes could
be costly and provide limited value.26
Guarantee schemes are, by far, the most prevalent mechanism
supporting the credit needs of Japanese businesses. In proportion to
its gross domestic product (GDP), Japan is the largest user of public
21
See Ricardo J. Caballero et al., Zombie Lending and Depressed
Restructuring in Japan, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1943, 1944 (2008) (indicating that
the phenomenon of zombie firms and zombie banks emerged in the 1990s).
22
Nobuyoshi Yamori, Japanese SMEs and the Credit Guarantee System
After the Global Financial Crisis, 3 COGENT ECON. & FIN. 1, 17 (2015).
23
For the impact on the use of collateral in secured transactions, see INT’L.
FIN. CORP., supra note 3, at 41–42.
24
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Insolvency Law as Credit Enhancement and
Enforcement Mechanism: A Closer Look At Global Modernization of Secured
Transactions Laws, 27 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 673, text accompanying
note 54 (2018).
25
See Thorsten Beck et al., Bank Financing for SMEs around the World 7–8
(WBG, Pol’y Rsch. Working Paper No. 4785, 2008),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/706131468159334938/pdf/WPS4785.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2UPT-MGZA] (discussing banks’ perception of government
programs that support SMEs in both developed and developing countries).
26
See Calice, supra note 8 (assessing implementation of the Principles for
public credit guarantees for SMEs).
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guarantees in the world.27 Acknowledging the negative effect of this
type of lending, Japan has undertaken efforts to modernize its secured
transactions framework to provide a legal environment more
conducive to market-based financing.28 The design of a guarantee
scheme will inevitably affect the deployment of any reformed secured
transactions framework in Japan, particularly to support asset-based
lending that relies on inventory and receivables as collateral.29
Public guarantees have proven to be an effective
countercyclical tool to address some negative consequences of
extraordinary events, such as natural disasters or credit crises.30 Their
role has also increased during the COVID-19 pandemic. However,
during these extraordinary situations and states of emergency, the
functions and features of public guarantees differ and do not apply
generally when assessing their role in facilitating access to credit in
economies.

27

See infra Section IV(0).
In relation to assignment of receivables, a new obligational law, enacted
May 26, 2017, entered into force April 1, 2020. An informal project to reform the
secured transaction law relating to movable assets (including receivables) is being
spearheaded by the Ministry of Justice, called “Dousan Saiken wo Chushin
toshita Tanpohousei ni Kansuru Kenkyukai” [Research Group on Security
Interest Primarily in Movable Assets and Receivables],
https://www.shojihomu.or.jp/kenkyuu/dou-tanpohousei [https://perma.cc/RQ74M8FZ] (last accessed Oct. 24, 2020). The Japan Business Credit Project (JBCP),
an ongoing research project of Professor Megumi Hara, Gakushuin University
School of Law, Professor Kumiko Koens, Yamagata University Faculty of
Literature and Social Sciences, and Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., University
of Pennsylvania Law School, involves an assessment of business credit and legal
framework in Japan, including financing secured by personal property. It
examines the reasons why such secured financing represents only a small portion
of Japanese business credit and why Japan has not adopted modern principles of
secured transactions law. Preliminary findings particularly relevant to this article
are that the prevalence of government guarantees of bank loans to SMEs
discourage the extension of such secured credit and impede the adoption of
secured transactions law reforms. See also Mooney, supra note 24.
29
See infra Section III(0).
30
See Arito Ono & Yukihiro Yasuda, Forgiveness Versus Financing: The
Determinants and Impact of SME Debt Forbearance in Japan, 17 RSCH. INST.
ECON., TRADE & INDUS. DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 1, 5 (2017),
https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/17e086.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY9YU2ZD] (stating that before the global financial crisis, 40% of Japanese SMEs had
their loans guaranteed).
28
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This article explores the key roles of guarantee schemes and
their effect on market-based financing. It finds ample evidence that
the system of guaranteed lending has negative economic
additionality. 31 Guaranteed lending does not facilitate “valuecreation-orientated” financing, highlighted in a 2012 report by the
Financial System Council of Japan.32 It stifles the growth of Japanese
SMEs and the exit of zombie companies. Its magnitude and
entrenchment is a significant hurdle to the development of marketbased financing. This article is organized as follows. After this
Introduction, Section II examines various types of state interventions
and their effect on access to credit. Section III describes the current
lending conditions in Japan, including the type of credit available to
SMEs and the secured transactions legal framework. Section IV
traces the evolution of guarantee schemes, maps the various types,
provides a detailed description of the Japanese Credit
Supplementation System, and highlights the functions of guarantee
schemes during crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic. Section
V identifies various incentives for Japanese lenders and borrowers to
utilize government-supported financing, and identifies distortions
caused by the guarantee scheme. Section VI concludes.

II.

STATE INTERVENTIONS IN CREDIT MARKETS: ARE
THEY INCENTIVIZING ACCESS TO CREDIT?

Various state interventions seek to facilitate access to credit
and contribute to the operation of a safe and sound financial system.
These interventions may be general providing an enabling legal and
regulatory environment, but also be specific affecting the allocation
31

See Facundo Abraham & Sergio L. Schmukler, Are Public Credit
Guarantees Worth the Hype? (WGB, Rsch. & Pol’y Brief No. 11, 2017),
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/431261511201811430/pdf/Arepublic-credit-guarantees-worth-the-hype.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF99-3SCK]
(stating that economic additionality means improvement in the performance of
borrowers); Calice, supra note 8. (arguing that measuring financial and economic
additionality of credit guarantee schemes remains challenging).
32
FIN. SYS. COUNCIL, THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY: DESIRABLE
STATE IN THE MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM (PRESENT STATE AND FUTURE
OUTLOOK) 14–15 (2012),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/singie_kinyu/20120831/01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PP8T-82WM].
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of credit risk or the cost structure of a transaction.33 The specific
measures include reducing capital requirements for selected types of
loans, imposing lending requirements on financial institutions to
dedicate a proportion of their loan book to a specific industry,
providing credit guarantees to cover post-default losses, establishing
and supporting state banks, or providing various refinancing facilities
where financial institutions may obtain funds against self-liquidating
instruments, such as loans secured with warehouse receipts.34 These
interventions are generally designed to address a credit market failure
that impairs access to credit.35
The existence of a market failure does not, on its own, provide
the basis to institutionalize a particular state intervention from the
menu of available options. 36 In many cases, especially for public
guarantees, they may distort the discipline of the competitive

33

See Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation, supra note 5, at 65–66.
See DE LA TORRE ET AL., supra note 16, at 77 (listing state intervetion
measures). See generally LEORA KLAPPER & RIDA ZAIDI, A SURVEY OF
GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND INTERVENTION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 102
(2005) (discussing other types of state interventions); infra Section IV(0)
(discussing other measures deployed during a crisis); Tatiana Didier et al.,
Financing Firms in Hibernation During the COVID-19 Pandemic 19 (WBG,
Pol’y Rsch. Working Paper No. 9236, 2020),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33745/FinancingFirms-in-Hibernation-during-the-COVID-19Pandemic.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/FW2C-JC2U]
(showing that authorizing the central bank to purchase portoflios of SME loans is
an example of a measure deployed during a crisis).
35
Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, Digital Technology-Based
Solutions for Enhanced Effectiveness of Secured Transactions Law: The Road To
Perfection?, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 25–26 (2018).
36
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Role of the State in Financial Markets, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIES 1993 19–20 (1994).
34
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market, 37 and even disadvantage the most innovative businesses.38
Guarantee schemes firmly entrenched within a system may become a
disincentive to institutionalizing an enabling legal and regulatory
environment.
Various
justifications
have
been
provided
for
institutionalizing state interventions to address a particular market
failure. The rationale for implementing directed lending programs
may be to channel financing to increase industry production,
especially where tariffs and subsidies are ineffective, 39 or where
specific projects would not otherwise be funded.40 A directed lending
policy typically requires financial institutions to dedicate a certain
percentage of their loan portfolio to a designated sector of the
economy, such as exports, manufacturing, or agriculture, but without
necessarily having to take any collateral.41 Other state interventions
have been implemented to facilitate the development of a certain
market followed by their gradual retraction when the market operates
efficiently. Bankers’ acceptances are one such measure utilized in
the United States to provide short-term trade finance under the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913. 42 Acceptances issued to finance
37

Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, On the Management of Financial
Guarantees, 21 Fin. Mgmt. 87, 103 (1992). For Japan, see Chusho-kigyo
Shoukibo-Jigyousha no Jigyou no Hatten wo Sasaeru Jizoku Kanouna
Sinyouhokan Seiso no Kakuritu ni Mukete [Small & Medium Enter. Pol’y Making
Council Fin. Working Grp., Working Paper on Establishment of Credit
Supplement System Fostering the Growth of SMEs, 2016],
https://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/koukai/shingikai/kihonmondai/2016/161221kihon
mondai2.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8QB-US6W] [hereinafter SME Credit
Supplement System].
38
Aaron Edlin, Overtaking, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE
RULE OF LAW 475 (F.H. Buckley ed. 2013).
39
See Dimitri Vittas & Yoon Je Cho, Credit Policies: Lessons from Japan
and Korea, 11 WORLD BANK RSCH. OBSERVER 277, 279 (1996) (“If firms lack
access to credit, other industrial policy tools, such as tariffs and subsidies, that
may rely on cost and profit incentives to increase production could prove
ineffective.”).
40
Stiglitz, supra note 36, at 19, 30.
41
See KLAPPER & ZAIDI, supra note 34 (stating that these programs have
generated many inefficiencies, including the misuse of allocated credit, increase
in the cost of finance for borrowers ineligible to benefit from the policy, and low
repayment rates).
42
Ralph T Helfrich, Trading in Bankers’ Acceptances: A View from the
Acceptance Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FED. RSRV. BANK OF
N.Y. MONTHLY REV., Feb. 1976, at 51.
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imports and exports, shipment and storage of goods were eligible for
discount43 by a Reserve Bank if they met certain criteria.44 They have
been gradually replaced by market-based financing products.
Credit market failures may become particularly acute in the
aftermath of extraordinary events necessitating the deployment of
state interventions to balance the countercyclical effects. The
effectiveness of these interventions depends to a great extent on the
magnitude of the crisis, its origins, and the overall level of nonperforming loans. 45 However, the connection between the two
applications is close, as an intervention established to bolster SME
access to credit during a crisis may persist. Their perpetuation
becomes problematic in that guarantee schemes designed to tackle
countercyclical effects when such circumstances no longer exist
transfer excessive credit risk to the public sector.46 The exponential
use of guarantee schemes to tackle the economic effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic presents a significant risk for market-based
financing if the schemes are not rolled back efficiently supporting
economic recovery.
Several state interventions have been deployed in Japan’s
recent history to stimulate access to credit. Many of them have
already been discontinued due to their negligible or questionable
economic impact. For instance, banker acceptances emerged as a
financing tool post World War I to stimulate commodities trading.47
43
This means a Reserve Bank may rediscount them for accepting banks at
the Federal Reserve’s Discount Rate.
44
Robert K. La Roche, Bankers Acceptances, 79 FED. RSRV. BANK OF
RICHMOND ECON. Q. 75, 78 (1993).
45
Douglas W. Arner et al., Financial Stability, Resolution of Systemic
Banking Crises and COVID-19: Toward an Appropriate Role for Public Support
and Bailouts 4 (Univ. of H.K. Fac. of L. Rsch. Paper No. 2020/044, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3664523
[https://perma.cc/2WAJ-72YH].
46
LUCIA CUSMANO, SME AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP FINANCING, THE ROLE
OF CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES AND MUTUAL GUARANTEE SOCIETIES IN
SUPPORTING FINANCE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 54 (OECD
& SME Entrepreneurship Papers, 2018), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/economics/sme-and-entrepreneurship-financing_35b8fece-en
[https://perma.cc/7XNS-XUZU].
47
Katsufumi Kanaoka, Nihon ni Okeru Ginkouhikiuketegataseido no
Sousetsu: 1919 (Taisho 8) ~ 1927 (Showa 2) nen ni Okeru
Ginkouhikiuketegatasijou no Tenkai [Creation of Banker’s Acceptance System in
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The Bank of Japan rediscounted eligible acceptances enhancing their
use and attractiveness for banks. However, because the eligibility
criteria were very strict, they were used less extensively than in the
United States. Several attempts to reinvigorate the acceptance market
in Japan failed. 48 The Japanese government also designed and
deployed directed lending schemes.49 These were used primarily to
expand capacity and modernize the industry in the 1950s and 1960s.50
Notably, the borrowers that received such financial assistance
increased investment, and within three years weaned themselves off
directed lending and relied instead on market-based loans. 51 At
different time periods, directed lending did not improve the
borrowers’ profitability or investment prospects.52 Over the decades,
guarantee schemes have grown significantly and remained the
dominant state intervention supporting access to credit for Japanese
SMEs.

III.

SME LENDING IN JAPAN: CONDITIONS AND LAW

This Section examines the lending environment in Japan,
setting the stage for analyzing the role of guaranteed and secured
lending. It acknowledges that the development of market-based
financing presupposes the existence of an effectively secured
transactions legal framework.
Such frameworks have been
constructed around a set of internationally recognized principles.
While presently the Japanese legal framework fails to meet them, a
Japan: Development of Banker’s Acceptance Market from 1919 to 1927],
NINGENSHAKAKIKANKYOUKENKYU 39–86 (2007).
48
Id.
49
See Iichiro Uesugi et al., The Effectiveness of Public Credit Guarantees in
the Japanese Loan Market, 24 J. JPN. INT’L ECON. 457, 460 (2010) (discussing the
credit guarantee system in Japan); Arito Ono et al., Are Lending Relationships
Beneficial or Harmful for Public Credit Guarantees? Evidence from Japan’s
Emergency Credit Guarantee Program, 9 J. FIN. STABILITY 151, 152 (2013)
(discussing public credit guarantees in Japan which include the credit guarantee
system).
50
Vittas & Cho, supra note 39, at 277, 282.
51
Vittas & Cho, supra note 39, at 286.
52
See Masami Imai, Regulatory Responses to Banking Crisis: Lessons from
Japan, 39 GLOB. FIN. J. 10, 14 (2019) (discussing the negative impact practices of
regulatory capital arbitrage had imposed on Japanese economy as well as
problems of Japanese government’s regulatory policies).
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legal reform effort has already been undertaken to incorporate a
number of those principles.
Lending Conditions
Japanese businesses have ample access to low-cost credit. In
2019, credit to the private sector exceeded 174% of the Japanese
GDP.53 Even though this percentage signifies a high maturity of the
financial market, a significant proportion of SME credit has been
supported by guarantee schemes. Interest rates on loans have been
hovering around historically low levels, and lending is increasing
annually at around 2%. 54 The Bank of Japan highlighted that
profitability of lending continues to decline in this environment that
increases competitive pressure on lenders to reduce the interest rate
below the risk commensurate to the loan. 55 This competitive
environment also has the effect of reducing the use of credit
guarantees because the applicable fees increase transactional costs.
However, the credit risk of financial institutions increases as the loans
are neither guaranteed nor collateralized.
Japanese businesses face numerous economic challenges,
including shrinking domestic markets, declining sales, sluggish
performance, and low competitiveness. 56 These challenges have
been compounded by guarantee schemes. The OECD concluded that
guaranteed lending in Japan results in weak profitability, low
productivity, and high leverage of SMEs.57 The Japan Productivity
Center found that Japan ranks 21st among the OECD countries in
labor productivity. 58 The unsuitability of guaranteed lending was
53

See Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)—Japan, THE WORLD
BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS?locations=JP
[https://perma.cc/7LGJ-2BDX] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020).
54
BANK OF JAPAN, FINANCIAL SYSTEM REPORT 1, 88 (Apr. 2019).
55
Id. at 2.
56
FIN. SYS. COUNCIL, supra note 32, at 14–15.
57
OECD, JAPAN: BOOSTING GROWTH AND WELL-BEING IN AN AGEING
SOCIETY 15 (2016). See Naoyuki Yoshino & Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary, Major
Challenges Facing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Asia and Solutions for
Mitigating Them 7 (ADBI Working Paper Series No. 564, 2016) (stating that only
5% of Japanese SMEs invest in research and development, which is
comparatively low).
58
Roudouseisansei no kokusaihikaku [International Comparison on Labor
Productivity], JAPAN PRODUCTIVITY CTR., https://www.jpc-
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confirmed in the Financial Sector Assessment Program Report of the
IMF.59
In the year of 2020, the number of bankruptcies in Japan
reached 7,773, which is the lowest in fifty years.60 This is attributable
primarily to the support of credit guarantees and other measures to
prop up failing businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic. 61
Liquidation is the dominant process.62 According to the 2020 World
Bank’s Doing Business Report for Japan, the recovery rate for
secured creditors is among the highest in the world, an average of
92.1 cents on the dollar of the creditor claims, compared to the OECD
average of 70.2.63 Insolvency thus does not pose a risk to secured
creditors.
The asset structure of Japanese businesses is conducive to
collateralized lending. According to Japan’s Ministry of Finance, in
2018, local companies (excluding banks and insurance companies)

net.jp/research/assets/pdf/R2attached2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PQJ-T2DD] (last
accessed Oct. 24, 2020).
59
IMF, JAPAN: FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: TECHNICAL
NOTE—LONG-TERM CHALLENGES FOR FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 55–57 (IMF
Country Report No. 17/283, Sept. 2017). See also Keieisha-Hosho ni Kansuru
Guideline Kenkyu-kai [Working Group on Guideline for Personal Guarantee
Provided by Business Owners] (2014); Keieisha-Hosho ni Kansuru Guideline
[Guideline for Personal Guarantee Provided by Business Owners] (2014);
Keieisha-Hosho ni Kansuru Guideline Kenkyu-kai [Working Group on Guideline
for Personal Guarantee Provided by Business Owners] (2014).
60
Zenkoku Tousan Joukyou (2020 nendo Kamihanki), TOKYO SHOKO RSCH.
(TSR), https://www.tsr-net.co.jp/en/bankruptcy/2020.html
[https://perma.cc/JXD3-E2WN] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
61
Cf. Kimie Harada et al., Lessons from Japan’s Shadow Financial
Regulatory Committee Japan in the Global Financial Crisis, in WORLD IN CRISIS:
INSIGHTS FROM SIX SHADOW FINANCIAL REGULATORY COMMITTEES FROM
AROUND THE WORLD 193, 219 (Robert Lipton ed., 2011).
62
Out of 8,517 insolvency cases in 2015, liquidation accounted for 97%.
Randall Jones & Yosuke Jin, Boosting Productivity for Inclusive Growth in Japan
13 (OECD Econ. Dep’t Working Paper No. 1414, 2017).
63
This impressive recovery rate reflects: (i) the average duration of
insolvency proceedings at 0.6 years, compared to the 1.7 years OECD average;
and (ii) the relatively low cost of insolvency proceedings at around 4.2% of the
debtor’s estate, compared to the OECD average of 9.3%. WBG, Doing Business
2020: Japan 104–105 (2020),
https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/j/japan/JPN.p
df [https://perma.cc/N5J5-4WA8].
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held receivables nearly equal in value to land. 64 Moreover, the
aggregate value of receivables and inventory was estimated to be
valued at around 1.5 times that of land. 65 Despite the value of
personal property that Japanese SMEs own, its use as collateral has
been negligible.66
Studies found that those Japanese borrowers that have longterm relationships with banks are more likely to provide collateral.67
While a typical Japanese SME has a long-term relationship with a
single bank, it engages in transactions with multiple financial
institutions.68 These multiple relationships are insurance for when
one of those financial institutions experiences difficulties that result
in retraction of lending. Given the common occurrence of borrowers
having relationships with multiple financial institutions, the use of
collateral is partially motivated by the desire of the financial
institution to establish the priority of its claim over the other financial
institutions with which the borrower transacts.69 Figure 1 presents
the total number of loans extended to Japanese borrowers that have
been secured with some asset.

64

MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUS. (METI), Financial Statements
Statistics of Corporations by Industry 2018, https://www.estat.go.jp/dbview?sid=0003060791 [https://perma.cc/L2HM-VECX] (last
accessed Oct. 24, 2020).
65
See Statistics of Japan, E-STAT, https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en
[https://perma.cc/2GLB-BSS4] (last accessed Oct. 24, 2020).
66
A study of a sample of 400,000 Japanese firms between 2007 and 2010
found that 51.9% mortgaged real estate, 23% did not provide any collateral, and
44.6% of firms obtained fully or partially guaranteed loans. Arito Ono et al., A
New Look at Bank-Firm Relationships and the Use of Collateral in Japan:
Evidence from Teikoku Databank Data, in THE ECONOMICS OF INTERFIRM
NETWORKS 204–205 (Tsutomu Watanabe et al. eds., 2015). This is at odds with
FSB data which indicated that over the last decade, collateralization of loans has
been reduced from over 90% of loans being secured with a right in an asset to less
than 80%. FSB, EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 13–14.
67
Arito Ono & Iichiro Uesugi, Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees
in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan’s SME Loan Market, 41 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANK. 935, 936 (2009).
68
Id., at 935, 937. It has been estimated that 80% of Japanese enterprises
have relationships with multiple banks. Ono et al., supra note 66.
69
Ono, supra note 67, at 951.
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Use of Asset-Based Lending (ABL) in Japan: Figure 170

Banks are the primary driver of SME finance in Japan. When
lending, banks rely on guarantees, and, to some extent, collateral,
disregarding the overall business value.71 Fintech credit (estimated
at 2.2 billion USD in 2019) in Japan is primarily extended in the form
of P2P/marketplace business and property lending. 72 Although
70
Teikoku Data Bank, Kigyou no Tayouna Sikinchoutatu Shuho ni Kansuru
Jittai Houkokusho 2019nen 2 gatsu [Report on the current status of various
corporate financing Feb 2019], MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUS. (METI) 5
(2019),
https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/keiei_innovation/sangyokinyu/itakuhouk
oku/06.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5RV-WYCL].
71
This practice leads to “Japanese version of lending exclusion.” In
contrast, some regional banks and credit unions challenge the traditional lending
model fostering “lending inclusion” by deploying different lending methods. The
FSA policies have contributed to this bipolarization in the lending market. See
FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY (FSA), Summary Points from Strategic Directions
and Priorities 2016–2017, https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2016/201611301/01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C92-7XTM] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020); Takunori
Hashimoto, The Bipolarization of the Regional Banks and Its Future “Problem
Solving Type Banks” and “Lending Exclusion Type Banks,” 14 J. JPN. SOC.
INTELL. PROD. 14, 15 (2018).
72
Giulio Cornelli et al, Fintech and Big Tech Credit: A New Database 8
(BIS, Working Paper No. 887, Sept. 2020).
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BigTech credit represents only a moderate share of overall credit,73
Japan is the second-largest market for BigTech credit (23.5 billion
USD in 2019).74 Rakuten has offered a suite of financial products in
Japan since 2013, including payments, lending, credit cards,
mortgages and insurance. 75 Social media company LINE offers
consumer lending (through a joint venture with Mizuho Bank and a
credit card company), telecommunication firm NTT DoCoMo
provides customer credit-scoring services (under contractual
agreement with banks and customers), and Amazon lends through its
seller lending program. 76 The second largest telecommunications
provider, KDDI, has a joint venture with MUFG Bank called Au
Jibun Bank.77
The use of collateralized lending presupposes the existence of
a legal framework that is conducive to that type of lending.78 Such a
legal framework enables an efficient use of personal property, such
as inventory and receivables as collateral for a loan.
Secured Transactions Frameworks: International Principles and
Japan
A modern secured transactions framework achieves several
objectives if it sits on top of a solid foundation.79 First, it facilitates
access to secured credit for businesses.80 Second, it fosters financial
73

Jon Frost et al, BigTech and the Changing Structure of Financial
Intermediation 11 (BIS, Working Paper No. 799, Apr. 2019).
74
Cornelli et al, supra note 72, at 8.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
In jurisdictions with outdated legal regimes, SMEs frequently cite
insufficient or unacceptable collateral as the reason for not being able to access
credit. See DE LA TORRE ET AL., supra note 16, at 5.
79
See EUR. BANK RECONSTRUCTION & DEV. (EBRD), Secured
Transactions, https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/legal-reform/access-tofinance/transactions.html [https://perma.cc/2XQQ-8EFY] (last accessed Nov. 1,
2020) (stating the Ten Core Principles published by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to supplement its 1994 Model Law on
Secured Transactions and the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) in its 2016 Model Law on Secured Transactions).
80
In some economies with inefficient secured transactions frameworks,
credit to the private sector may be around 30% of their gross domestic product
(GDP). See IFC, supra note 3, at 5.
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inclusion by expanding finance in underserved segments of the
economy. 81 Finally, when coordinated with prudential regulatory
standards, it reinforces financial stability and responsible lending.82
Such a solid foundation should be constructed from a set of principles.
These principlescover all aspects of secured transactions,
addressing risks, inefficiencies and frictions. They include: (i)
comprehensive coverage of all forms of security interests in personal
property (the functional approach); (ii) enabling the borrower to,
efficiently and at a low cost, create a security interest without
depriving it of the use of those assets; (iii) security interests available
over all types of personal property, to secure all types of obligations,
between all types of persons; (iv) effective means of publicizing the
existence of security interests to third parties; (v) an electronic and
notice-based registry that enables searches according to identifiers of
persons who granted security interests; (vi) priority rules that enable
access to credit from multiple creditors, including suppliers and
lessors; (vii) predictable rules governing the competing rights of
persons in the collateral, including non-consensual creditors; (viii) on
default, the ability to promptly and efficiently enforce a security
interest against the collateral to satisfy the secured obligation; (ix)
predictable conflicts of laws rules that determine the law applicable
to various aspects of the secured transaction; and (x) the protection of
a security interest in insolvency.83
The Japanese secured transactions framework deviates from
most of these principles. Foremost, it does not follow the functional
approach that recognizes multiple security devices that may be used
side by side without a coherent priority regime underpinned by an

81

See generally INT’L FIN. CORP. (IFC), Financial Inclusion: Creating
Opportunity through Financial, https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1116ecf69fdb-415f-ae2f304a8b9dc8d8/Financial+Inclusion.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=kkIBXtL
[https://perma.cc/JE46-8GNH] (last accessed Oct. 30, 2020).
82
See Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation, supra note 5; Castellano &
Dubovec, Global Regulatory Standards, supra note 5.
83
See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Lost in Transplantation? Modern
Principles of Secured Transactions Law as Legal Transplants, in SECURED
TRANSACTIONS LAW IN ASIA: PRINCIPLES, PERSPECTIVES AND REFORM (Louise
Gullifer & Dora Neo eds., 2020); MAREK DUBOVEC & LOUISE GULLIFER,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM IN AFRICA 36–40 (2019).
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electronic registration system. 84 The Civil Code recognizes the
following four types of security interests (real rights) (i) pledge; (ii)
hypothec; (iii) preferential rights (e.g., a right to the payment of
wages); and (iv) rights of retention. Japanese SMEs also utilize trade
credit, where the seller may retain ownership until payment of the
purchase price in full while the buyer/debtor acquires possession and
use of the asset.85 New types of security interests emerged through
case law or were provided for in special statutes, such as for the
financing of cars, agricultural products, construction machines,
aircraft, ships, or the entirety of assets of particular types of
businesses, such as railroad companies.86 As a consequence of these
developments, the legal framework is fragmented.
Some security interests, such as the sale and leaseback or
security transfer of ownership [joto-tanpo] emerged in response to
the impracticality of the Civil Code. The impracticalities exist with
respect to the failure to recognize a security interest over an asset in
possession of a borrower that needs to use or sell it, the inefficiency
of the enforcement provisions, as well as the need to more easily
achieve priority over competing claims.87 The increasing growth in
utilization of joto-tanpo in practice has been supported by a number
of Supreme Court decisions. 88 However, this device has practical
limitations, including the inability to cover all assets that typically
secure an asset-based loan, especially inventory, receivables, and
proceeds, as well as the uncertainty stemming from the effect of
registration.89 Unlike the United States, Japan has not established an
84

For the explanation of the functional approach, see Hideki Kanda,
Methodology for Harmonization and Modernization of Legal Rules on Secured
Transactions: Legal, Functional, or Otherwise?, 22 UNIF. L. REV. 885, 885–886
(2017).
85
Daisuke Tsuruta, How Do Small Businesses Finance Their Growth
Opportunities?—The Case of Recovery from the Lost Decade in Japan, 33
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 189, 191 (2012).
86
HIROTO DOGAUCHI & TANPO BUKKEN HOU, SECURITY INTEREST LAW
(4th ed., 2017); Megumi Hara, Japan, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW IN ASIA:
PRINCIPLES, PERSPECTIVES, AND REFORM (Louise Gullifer and Dora Neo eds.,
2020).
87
Id. at 6–7. See also HISAKAZU MATSUOKA & TANPO BUKKEN HOU,
SECURITY INTEREST LAW 208–311 (Nihonhyoronsha, 2017); HIROSHI ODA,
JAPANESE LAW 166, 177 (3d ed., 2009).
88
See, e.g., Hanrei Jihou Sept. 28, 1982 [1981(O) No. 1209] No. 1062, 81.
89
Hara, supra note 86.
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equivalent to the UCC Article 9 filing system. In such a legal
environment, it is challenging for Japanese lenders, when they extend
market-based or guaranteed loans, to reliably take a security interest
in some collateral.
Recent reforms to facilitate the financing of receivables by
limiting the effect of anti-assignment clauses are a step forward.
However, they fall short of aligning the Japanese framework with the
international principles.90 Given the many departures of the Japanese
secured transactions framework from the modern principles, steering
lenders toward asset-based lending may present legal risks that would
make the cost of such credit uneconomical and unattractive as
compared to guaranteed loans. The abundance of low-cost
guaranteed credit affects the incentives to consider reform of the
Japanese secured transactions framework to align closely with the
international principles.91

90

Id.
The design of a secured transactions reform in Japan and the effect of
public guarantees is being explored by the Japan Business Credit Project. The
Secured Transactions Law Reform in Japan: Globally and in Japan Conference,
co-organized by The Bank of Japan, Gakushuin University, Nishimura & Asahi,
and University of Pennsylvania Law School, held July 30-31, 2018 in Tokyo,
recognized and discussed the connection between public guarantee schemes and
secured lending in Japan. Those discussions also influenced the focus of this
article. The Japan Business Credit Project (JBCP) is a research project of
Professor Megumi Hara, Gakushuin University School of Law, Professor Kumiko
Koens, Yamagata University Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, and
Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., University of Pennsylvania Law School. The
JBCP has undertaken more than 30 semi-structured interviews of bankers, legal
practitioners, academics, and government officials. The project involves an
assessment of business credit in Japan, including financing secured by movables
and receivables and the relevant legal framework. It includes an examination of
the reasons why such secured financing represents only a small portion of
Japanese business credit and why Japan has not adopted modern principles of
secured transactions law. Preliminary findings particularly relevant to this paper
are that the prevalence of government guarantees of bank loans to SMEs
discourage the extension of such secured credit and impede the adoption of
secured transactions law reforms. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Insolvency Law as
Credit Enhancement and Enforcement Mechanism: A Closer Look at Global
Modernization of Secured Transactions Laws, 27 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
673 (2018); Mooney, supra note 83; 83Hara, supra note 86.
91
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IV. CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES: EVOLUTION,
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES, TYPES, AND THE JAPANESE
STRUCTURE
Evolution
From their emergence in nineteenth century Europe,
guarantee schemes proliferated in the last decades.92 Particularly in
some OECD countries, they have become the policy of choice for
supporting SME credit.93 The reasons for their establishment vary
and also depend on the state of the financial market. In economies
with developing financial markets that do not efficiently distribute
risks, guarantee schemes have played a transitory role providing a
bridge to market-based financing.94
Guarantee schemes in Japan have a long history, operating at
the level of prefectures with support from a central governmental
agency. In 1948, the Japanese government established the Small and
Medium Enterprise Agency, which led the process of forming
prefectural credit guarantee corporations (CGCs). 95 The Credit
Guarantee Law No. 196 of 1953 governs the establishment,
administration, and operations of CGCs that are subject to the
supervision of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI),
the Financial Services Agency (FSA), as well as local authorities in
the prefectures where they operate.

92

OCED, FACILITATING ACCESS TO FINANCE: DISCUSSION PAPER ON
CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES 3 (2010),
https://www.oecd.org/globalrelations/45324327.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8R22E3B].
93
See also Uesugi, supra note 49, at 458; Moustafa Chatzouz et al., Credit
Guarantee Schemes for SME Lending in Western Europe 10 (Eur. Inv. Fund
(EIB), Working Paper No. 2017/42, June 2017),
http://www.eif.org/news_centre/publications/eif_wp_42.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CR46-3CST].
94
Deniz Anginer et al., Risk-Bearing by the State: When Is It Good Public
Policy?, J. FIN. STABILITY 76 (2013),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/13732?show=full
[https://perma.cc/8583-NMGN]. The inefficient distribution of risks is largely
attributable to the lenders’ lack the expertise in extending and administering loans
secured with personal property.
95
Uesugi, supra note 49, at 460–61.
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Since 1951, the government has insured guarantees issued by
the prefectural CGCs. 96 Today, the insurance is provided by the
Japan Finance Corporation (JFC). The JFC’s role is to (i) provide a
safety net to respond to risks from unexpected circumstances97 such
as natural disasters; (ii) support start-ups; and (iii) facilitate
revitalization and foreign expansion of businesses. 98 JFC also
extends loans directly to businesses. 99 As of March 2019, JFC’s
loans to SMEs represented 4.2% of all SME loans in the economy.
JFC disbursed loans to 0.88 million microenterprises, about half of
which were sole proprietors 100 —86.7% of these loans were not
supported by any collateral. 101 The JFC and the CGCs form the
Credit Supplementation System.102

96

In 1958, the insurance function was transferred from the government to
the Small Business Credit Insurance Corporation. Atsuo Kuroda, Credit
Supplementation System for Unlocking SME and Startup Access to Finance, The
Case of Japan, in UNLOCKING SME FINANCE IN ASIA, ROLES OF CREDIT RATING
AND CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES 247 (Naoyuki Yoshino & Farhad TaghizadehHesary eds., 2019).
97
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry decided to activate the
safety net guarantee for the companies suffering from declining sales due to the
coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and to widen the types of beneficiaries
covered by the safety net guarantee. See MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUS.
(METI), Measure for Supporting SME’s Affected by Novel Coronavirus to be
Taken (Designation of Areas Subject to No. 4 Safety Nets for Financing
Guarantee) (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2019/02/20200228001/20200228001.html
[https://perma.cc/D9H9-V7UW]; see also MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUS.
(METI), We Will Take Measures for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Related
to the New Coronavirus Infection (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2019/03/20200303002/20200303002.html
[https://perma.cc/WV4R-KU85].
98
JAPAN FIN. CORP. (JFC) 2018 Japan Finance Corporation Annual Report
6 (2018), https://www.jfc.go.jp/n/english/pdf/jfc2018e_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/57FV-5KVW].
99
In contrast, the SBA pulled back from making direct loans in the mid1980s acknowledging that the private market is more efficient in deciding which
loans should be extended. See Craig et al., supra note 1, at 350.
100
JFC 2019 Japan Finance Corporation Annual Report (2019),
https://www.jfc.go.jp/n/english/pdf/jfc2019e_3.pdf. See also JFC, supra note 98.
101
JFC 2019, supra note 100.
102
See JFC, supra note 98, at 52.
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Figure 2: The Credit Supplementation System103
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Since its inception, the beneficiaries of the Credit
Supplementation System have expanded. New economic sectors
have been added, and the caps on borrower size and guarantee limits
have increased. 104 Only certain types of SMEs, operating in the
agriculture, forestry, fishery, or finance sectors remain ineligible.105
International Perspectives
Many guarantee schemes were set up decades ago, during
which their effect on access to credit has grown. Globally, Japan and
Korea are the leaders in the use of credit guarantees. Guaranteed loans
represent a large share of their GDP—7.3% in Japan and 6.2% in
Korea in 2011.106 By contrast, credit guarantees represent only 0.4%

103

JAPAN FED’N CREDIT GUAR. CORPS., Credit Guarantee System In Japan
2020 5 (2020),
https://www.zenshinhoren.or.jp/document/Credit_Guarantee_System_in_Japan_2
020.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3TV-RVEC] (last accessed Apr. 17, 2021).
104
CREDIT GUAR. CORP. TOKYO, Annual Report 2019 3, 5 (2019),
https://www.cgc-tokyo.or.jp/about/public/annualreport2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7FXQ-KTWJ].
105
The ineligible economic sectors are set out in in the enforcement
regulation under the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act.
See JFC, supra note 98, at 7.
106
CUSMANO, supra note 46, at 11.
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of GDP in the United States, and less than 0.1% of GDP in Canada.107
The global median was 0.11% of GDP in 2014.108 On average, one
third of Japanese SMEs obtain loans guaranteed through the Credit
Supplementation System.109 Globally, the proportion of a country’s
SMEs with a loan covered by a credit guarantee averages less than
2%. 110 The percentage of Japanese SMEs that obtain guaranteed
loans is even higher in some areas.111 For instance, the Tokyo CGC
guarantees loans to 42.6% SMEs operating in the Tokyo
Metropolitan Area, 74.2% of which have fewer than five
employees.112
A set of globally recognized principles have been
promulgated to guide the establishment and operation of guarantee
schemes. The overarching objective of these principles is to ensure
financial sustainability of schemes, for their administrators to apply
proper risk mitigation mechanisms, and the fee structure to reflect the
riskiness of the loan applicant. In 2015, the World Bank published
Principles for Public Credit Guarantee Schemes for SMEs, which
cover four aspects: (i) legal and regulatory framework; (ii) corporate
governance; (iii) operational framework; and (iv) monitoring and
evaluation.113
The first area covers the Principles relevant to this article.
Principle 8 recommends that schemes implement an effective and
comprehensive risk management framework that identifies risks
related to its operation, and use credit risk mitigation techniques, such
as counter-guarantees (insurance). Principle 11 recommends that
schemes provide partial coverage of losses upon default, and that the
107

Id. at 12, 46; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data (FRED),
Gross Domestic Product for Canada, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (July 2, 2020),
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MKTGDPCAA646NWDB
[https://perma.cc/2FXC-Q844].
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Abraham & Schmukler, supra note 31.
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See Colacelli & Hong, supra note 9, at 51; Kuroda, supra note 96, at
247.
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Abraham & Schmukler, supra note 31.
111
Id. at 51.
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CREDIT GUAR. CORP. TOKYO, supra note 104, at 11–12. Over 90% of
loans guaranteed by the Tokyo CGC are used to cover operating expenses.
113
See WBG, Priciples for Public Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGSs) for
SMEs, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/publication/principlesfor-public-credit-guarantee-schemes-cgss-for-smes [https://perma.cc/BMT4HY72] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020).
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guarantee should be designed to comply with capital requirements for
credit risk. The coverage ratio should exceed 50% as any lower
coverage might not be a sufficient incentive for lenders to extend
credit.114 The Principles recommend that the fee reflect the riskiness
of the particular guarantee, and should be adjustable to ensure
financial sustainability of the scheme.115
Most of the schemes were established prior to the adoption of
the Principles. Over the decades, their types, structures, and risk
formulae have been shaped by various factors. As a result, there is
no universally recognized structure or product that they offer.
Types of Credit Guarantee Schemes
Guarantee schemes may be categorized based on different
features of the products they offer. Guarantees may be (i) available
for portfolios or individual loans; (ii) wholly unsecured or require
creditors to take collateral; (iii) covering a percentage of the
outstanding amount (80–100%) or the actual loss after enforcement
upon default, known as second-loss guarantees. Credit guarantees
may cover loans for working capital as well as investment.116
Different factors affect the design of a guarantee scheme. For
instance, individual guarantees are used when the staff of the
financial institution have particular expertise in assessing various
risks, while a different risk management approach is necessary to
guarantee portfolios.117 The individual approach is more appropriate
for larger loans, while the portfolio approach is more cost-efficient
for smaller loans or loans given to particular types of SMEs.118
The entities that issue guarantees may be: (i) public; (ii)
public-private; or (iii) private. The first type is an important policy
114

Id. at 20.
Id. at 38.
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Around the World 6 (WBG, Dev. & Pol’y Rsch. Group Working Paper No. 4771,
2008), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/937071468314370786/Thetypology-of-partial-credit-guarantee-funds-around-the-world
[https://perma.cc/FB4W-YC9R].
118
WBG, supra note 113, at 36.
115

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss3/1

400

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 16

tool of a government, and it is the main focus of this article. 119
Guarantee schemes can be administered by: (i) international
organizations; (ii) governments; (iii) corporations; or (iv) mutual
guarantee associations. The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) Development Credit Authority’s partial
credit guarantees are an example of an international scheme that aims
to promote lending in underserved markets.120 International schemes
are often accompanied by technical assistance to upgrade the
participating lenders’ credit origination and risk management
skills.121 Corporate schemes are funded and operated by the private
sector, such as banks and chambers of commerce. Lastly, mutual
guarantee associations are private sector schemes formed and
managed by borrowers who contribute to a common fund that
guarantees the repayment of a loan given to a member of the
association.
The risk sharing formulae also differ. In one type of
arrangement, the guarantor shares the losses pari passu with the
lender or its right to recovery may be wholly subordinated to the
lender. 122 These formulae may be affected by regulatory aspects,
such as the rules to prevent state aid within the European Union that
requires losses to be sustained proportionally between the scheme
operator and participating lenders. 123 Schemes employ lossmitigation tools, such as counter-guarantees. If these counterguarantees or insurance are provided by governmental institutions,
that may enhance the credibility and reputation of the scheme.124
119

CUSMANO, supra note 46, at 16.
U.S. AGENCY INT’L DEV., Development Credit Authority: Putting Local
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22, 2020).
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Some schemes are designed to operate specifically in
conjunction with loans secured by personal property collateral. For
instance, the World Bank Group supports the Second Loss Partial
Credit Guarantee program, which is a structure that covers the risk of
lenders that the proceeds from enforcement of a security interest will
not suffice to fully satisfy the secured obligation.125 This may occur
because the borrower obstructed the enforcement process or illiquid
secondary markets preclude the sale of the collateral for a reasonable
price. This structure incentivizes the lender to develop expertise in
valuing, monitoring, and liquidating the collateral because it may
claim payment on the guarantee only when the enforcement process
was frustrated or the collateral sold for value less than the estimated
liquidation value at the time of origination. 126 However, this
guarantee scheme structure has some downsides. Foremost, covering
losses caused by an inefficient enforcement framework may become
a disincentive to the government to seriously consider reforming that
framework to expedite enforcement of security interests.
Guarantee schemes in many developed economies are almost
fully funded by fees and recoveries of collateral on defaulted loans.127
Between 2016 and 2019, the United States Small Business
Administration (SBA) did not require any government funding to
subsidize the cost of its loan guaranty programs.128 Even the largest
of these subsidies amounts to less than one thousandth of one percent
of U.S. GDP.129 Similarly, in Canada, even the largest shortfalls of
the Canada Small Business Financing Program, which offers 85%
credit guarantees on SME loans, amounted to only three thousandth
125

See also Second Loss Partial Credit Guarantee: Unlocking the Potential
of Small and Medium Enterprises with an Innovative, Risk-Sharing Financing
Solution, WBG, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/362121537458541440/SLPCGBrochure-Jun11-hi-res.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW5N-XZ5G] (last accessed Oct.
22, 2020).
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LOAN GUARANTY PROGRAM 21 (2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41146.pdf
[https://perma.cc/59C7-TPCB].
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Id. From 2010 to 2015, the SBA received annual subsidies of between
$45 million and $316 million.
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Id. In 2013, the SBA received $316.3 million in total subsidies for its
loan guaranty programs. The US GDP in 2013 was $16.69 trillion. See United
States, WORLD BANK DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/country/US
[https://perma.cc/ZVW9-STRD] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020).
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of one percent of its GDP. 130 Although the schemes are usually
subsidized from public resources, only a few disclose their financial
data transparently.131
The optimal credit guarantee fee should be sensitive to
macroeconomic fluctuations as well as to loan applicants’
creditworthiness.132 To incentivize SMEs to improve their financial
health and to avoid moral hazard, the fee should be commensurate to
the SME risk profile.133 To promote borrowing during a recession or
crisis, the fee should decrease to accommodate SMEs’ lower output
levels and higher default risk ratio.134 During an economic boom,
complementary to contractionary monetary policy, the fee should
increase to reduce demand and discourage aggressive lending to
prevent the creation of a bubble.135
Regulatory Treatment of Guaranteed Loans
Regulatory treatment of loans is an important consideration
for lenders, including when deciding on the type of security to to
mitigate risks. Loans guaranteed by a qualified scheme may provide
a regulatory benefit that may not be available for loans that are
unsecured or secured with some collateral. This benefit may thus
provide an economic incentive to utilize a particular credit risk
mitigant. A survey of European banks found that one of the reasons
for the use of public guarantees is capital relief since the portion of
the loan covered by a guarantee may be subject to a lower risk
weight. 136 Another study on the impact of public guarantees in
Western Europe revealed that about half of the banks that the study
130

See Canada GDP, TRADING ECON.,
https://tradingeconomics.com/canada/gdp [https://perma.cc/C9JX-LCJB] (last
accessed Oct. 22, 2020) (stating that the shortfall peaked at CAD 48.6 million in
FY 2008-09). The Canadian GDP in 2009 was $1.37 trillion.
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Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary et al., A Model For Calculating The Optimal
Credit Guarantee Fee for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (Asian Dev. Bank
Inst., Working Paper No. 1045, Nov. 2019),
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/541041/adbi-wp1045.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PXT-2K3K].
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covered reported that capital relief provided by guarantees is an
important consideration for their use.137
Depending on how the Basel Accords are domestically
implemented, guarantees may reduce risk weights. 138 Some
guarantees may benefit from regulatory relief only if the payment
does not require the lender first having to pursue the borrower. Thus,
this benefit would not accrue if the guarantee were designed as a
second loss guarantee requiring the lender to first pursue the borrower
and only then claim a payment for any outstanding losses.
In Japan, two separate capital requirements regimes apply
based on the type of financial institution: (i) the international (Basel
Accord) standard applies to banks with overseas branches; and (ii)
the domestic standard applies to other banks.139 Though they differ
in some ways, they share the same methods in the calculation of the
capital relief. Of sixty-four regional banks, fourty-five use the
standardized approach to calculate capital charges, as do thirty-eight
of fourty second regional banks.140 These two types of banks utilize
around half of all CGC guarantees as shown in the following figures.
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Id. at 5.
A reduction may be available whether the financial institution utilizes the
standardized or internal-ratings based approach. Id. at 34.
139
JFSA Notification No. 19 of 2006 (Ginkouhou Dai14jouno2 no Kiteini
Motoduki, Ginkouga Sono Hoyuusuru Sisantou ni Terashi Jikosihon no Juujituno
Joukyouga Tekisetu dearukadouka wo Handansurutameno Kijun),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/policy/basel_ii/ginkou1-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB83XXB8] (last accessed Nov. 3, 2020) (Japan).
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JAPAN, https://www.chiginkyo.or.jp/app/contents.php?category_id=17
[https://perma.cc/6HW3-2U2W] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020); English TOP, 2ND
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[https://perma.cc/W3E3-H642] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020).
138

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss3/1

404

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

Figure 3: Number of Banks Using Standardized Approach

Figure 4: Use of Credit Guarantees According to the Type of the Bank
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Along with credit derivatives,141 depending on the nature of
the issuer and their terms, guarantees may qualify as unfunded credit
protection.142 For a scheme funded by a government with a AAA
rating, the risk weight may be reduced to zero.143 After announcing
and supporting the measures to encourage SME loan restructuring, in
December of 2008, the risk weight of the guaranteed amount of the
loan was reduced to zero.144 During the COVID-19 pandemic, banks
can assign zero risk weights to loans covered by public guarantee
schemes and draw down their high-quality liquid assets below the
minimum liquidity coverage ratio requirement.
Principle 11 of the World Bank Group Principles for Public
Credit Guarantee Schemes for SMEs recommends that “The
guarantees should be . . . designed to ensure compliance with the
relevant prudential requirements for lenders, in particular with capital
requirements for credit risk.” The World Bank further explains that
credit guarantees should be designed to meet the parameters
prescribed by the Basel Accords to provide capital relief
corresponding to the proportion of the credit exposure covered by the
guarantee as well as to comply with the provisioning rules. 145
Depending on the implementation of the Basel Accords, the structure
of the guarantee may thus influence the capital treatment of the
guaranteed loan, which in turn could be an incentive or a disincentive
for regulated financial institutions to utilize a particular type of
guarantee. Requiring some collateral as a condition of issuing a
guarantee should enhance the recovery rate of the loan without any
negative impact on the capital relief benefit.
After the adoption of the 2009 SME Financing Facilitation
Act, Japanese financial institutions could exclude restructured SME
loans from non-performing loans.146 This option is available if the
141
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See also Castellano & Dubovec, Bridging the Gap, supra note 5, at 63–
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Chatzouz et al., supra note 93, at 33–34.
CUSMANO, supra note 46, at 28.
144
See Harada et al., supra note 61, at 218–219. Under the Emergency Credit
Guarantee Program, introduced to ameliorate the effect of the credit crisis in
October 2008, the risk weight of the guaranteed loans was reduced from 10% to 0.
See Ono et al., supra note 49, at 153.
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financial institution expects the loans to perform within five years.
Even though the Act ceased to have effect in March 2013, financial
institutions have continued to grant requests for restructuring of loans,
accepting 95% of applications. 147 The Act, and the practice it
fostered, was criticized as the Japanese government using its
discretion to soften prudential regulation that sustains zombie
companies. 148 This policy benefited financially weak financial
institutions and their borrowers that would otherwise have been
liquidated.149
Operational Structure of the Japanese Credit Supplementation
System
The Japanese Credit Supplementation System has a twotiered structure that includes the JFC and prefectural CGCs. This
structure is composed of a web of contractual relationships.
Prefectural CGCs enter into blanket agreements with financial
institutions that govern the general parameters of those relationships
for any future lending activities. The Federation of CGCs issues a
template, which may be modified by the prefectural CGCs, although
that has not been common. For a guaranteed loan, the financial
institution and the CGCs enter into a contract specific to that loan.
Naturally, the financial institution and the borrower enter into a
separate loan agreement. Finally, the CGC enters into an agreement
with the borrower.
There are two ways in which an application for a guarantee
may be generated: (i) by the prospective borrower who applies
directly with the CGCs, or (ii) by the financial institution on behalf
of the prospective borrower.150 The following is the usual process
from the application for a guarantee to its satisfaction:

Revived Underperforming Firms?, J. RISK FIN. MGMT. 3–4 (2019); Kimie Harada
et al., Japan’s Financial Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis, 7
J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 51, 62 (2015).
147
Yamori, supra note 146, at 4.
148
Id. at 5.
149
See Imai, supra note 52, at 11.
150
Ono et al., supra note 49, at 152.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

2021]
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

407

SME (borrower) applies for a credit guarantee from the
CGC directly or indirectly through a financial institution
(lender).
If approved (the CGC assesses the SME’s
creditworthiness), SME and CGC enter into an agreement.
Upon satisfactory completion of its due diligence, the
lender enters into a contract and extends a loan to the SME.
CGC and the financial institution enter into a contract
related to the specific loan (the two already entered into an
umbrella agreement).
CGC obtains insurance for the guarantee from the Japan
Finance Corporation (JFC) under a blanket contract
previously entered into.
SME pays the guarantee fee to CGC.
CGC pays the insurance premium to JFC.
SME
(8a) repays the loan and the transaction terminates, or
(8b) defaults.
If the latter happens, CGC is informed and verifies that a
default occurred.
CGC pays the guaranteed amount (up to 80%) within 90
days and subrogates to the rights of the financial institution.
JFC pays the insurance money to CGC.
CGC and the financial institution begin enforcement of
their rights against the SME.
After the CGC recovers from the borrower to cover the
amount of the guarantee, it remits any excess to the JFC.

The JFC provides different types of general and special
insurance products to CGCs. These products effectively allow the
CGCs to transfer the credit risk to the JFC. Special insurance
products are directed at transactions where the SME faces some
unpredictable challenges, such as a natural disaster or to support new
business opportunities.151 JFC provides specific types of insurance
to facilitate the use of asset-based lending, including to facilitate
restructuring of a business in insolvency. An asset-based lending

151

Kuroda, supra note 96, at 255.
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(ABL) guarantee was introduced in August 2007.152 The insurance
ratio is 80% and the JFC charges a fixed rate of 0.46%.153 However,
the ABL guarantee is available only when the loan is secured with
liquid collateral, which is defined to include ordinary receivables
generated from sales of goods, receivables in the form of promissory
notes, electronically recorded receivables and inventory.154
Collateral thus plays a role in the ABL guarantee. Overall,
collateralization affects the amount of guarantees that may be issued
by CGCs, which is limited to 80 million Japanese Yen (JPY).
General guarantees may be extended up to 200 to 400 million JPY
depending on the type of borrower.155
Figure 5: Satisfaction of a Loan Covered by a Credit Guarantee
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Some earlier studies showed understaffing of the CGCs and
the perceived inability to adequately assess guarantee applications.
In the Tokyo Guarantee Corporation, the number of approved
guarantees per employee was 168 in 2011, while the ratio for
employees of private sector banks was forty to eighty loan
152
Kigyou no Tayouna Sikin Choutatu Shuhou ni Kansuru Jittai Chousa
[Research on Diverse Fundraising Methods of Company] 5 (Ministry Econ.,
Trade & Indus. (METI) Rsch. Paper, 2019).
153
Kuroda, supra note 96, at 254.
154
The Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act, Law No.
264 of 1950, arts. 3–4; Order for Enforcement of the Small and Medium-sized
Enterprise Credit Insurance Act, Cabinet Order No. 350 of 1950, art. 7.
155
JAPAN FED’N CREDIT GUAR. CORPS., supra note 103, at 8.
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approvals. 156 A 2016 World Bank assessment of sixty credit
guarantee schemes found that the global median level is twentynine.157
In the Japan Revitalization Strategy 2015, the Small and
Medium Enterprise Agency was mandated to “consider creditguarantee system’s direction to promote active support by financial
institutions to SMEs.” Shortly thereafter, the Financial Working
Group was established within the Small and Medium Enterprise
Policy Making Council, and a year later issued a report “Establishing
a Sustainable Credit Enhancement System to Support the
Development of Business of SMEs and Small Enterprises.”158 This
report recognized the important role of credit guarantees in SME
development, contributing to productivity and regional revitalization,
but also highlighted the need to minimize side effects. 159 The
Financial Working Group considered the potential effect of reducing
the guarantee coverage blanketly from 100% to 80%, but concluded
that such a reduction would not have an impact on the behavior of
financial institutions in terms of fostering SME development. A
significantly larger reduction might have that effect, but that would
risk reduction in overall lending.160 Notably, the Tokyo CGC had
already introduced an 80% cap in October 2007.161
The 2018 reforms institutionalized the maximum coverage of
80% of the outstanding loan amount, with the exception of loans to
start-ups and microenterprises and for loans extended during a
crisis.162 Presently, financial institutions have two options as to how
to share the risk of loss with CGCs: (i) the partial guarantee method
under which 80% of the outstanding amount is guaranteed and paid
upon satisfaction of the prescribed conditions; and (ii) the burden
charge method under which 100% is guaranteed and paid upon
156
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See Calice, supra note 8.
158
Nobuyoshi Yamori, Japan’s Credit Guarantee System Reform of 2017
and New Functions of Credit Guarantee Associations 2–3 (Rsch. Inst. Econ. &
Bus. Admin. (RIEB), Kobe Univ. Discussion Paper Series DP2018-03, Feb. 13,
2018), https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2018-03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZWW4-JRMK].
159
Id. at 3.
160
Id. at 4.
161
CREDIT GUAR. CORP. TOKYO, supra note 104, at 10.
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satisfaction of the prescribed conditions, but later the financial
institution pays back a 20% contribution to the CGC.163 A 2019 IMF
Working Paper highlighted that the 80% coverage is still considered
high.164
If the SME defaults and owes 10 million JPY on a guaranteed
loan, the CGC covers 80%, which corresponds to 8 million JPY. The
JFC insures 70–90% (in many cases 80%) of the CGC’s guarantee
which corresponds to 5.6 million to 7.2 million JPY.165
Figure 6: Risk Sharing Scheme

The operations of CGCs are financed primarily by credit
guarantee fees, returns on the investment of CGC assets and
insurance payments from the JFC. In addition, the national
government and local governments, including the Improvement and
Promotion of Business Support for SMEs, also provide financial
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support to the CGCs to strengthen their financial positions. Financial
institutions also provide contributions that are tax deductible.166
The guarantee fee is determined at the outset of the transaction,
so it does not take into account any changes in the creditworthiness
of the borrower.167 Additional fees are levied upon default. In 2006,
a new system for JFC to collect fees was introduced categorizing
borrowers into nine buckets, which was repealed in the aftermath of
the 2008 credit crisis when the system reverted to a flat 0.75%–0.8%
fee irrespective of the riskiness of the borrower.168 Later, the system
categorizing borrowers into nine buckets was re-introduced.169
Credit Guarantee Programs During Crises
Guarantee schemes have played an important role during
various crises.170 The underlying purpose of some schemes is to act
as a countercyclical mechanism during crises when financial
institutions restrict lending. Unsurprisingly, their role has been
amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic. Recognizing that
financial institutions are likely to respond to the uncertain economic
recovery by limiting lending to reduce risk, the COVID-19 related
programs seek to avoid the sharp contraction.171
A slew of measures to financially support businesses has been
rolled out to address the negative economic impact of COVID-19.172
The Bank for International Settlements, IMF, and the World Bank
have encouraged regulators to maintain financial stability, market
166

Colacelli & Hong, supra note 9, at 12.
Chau-Jung Kuo et al., Evaluating Guarantee Fees for Loans to Small
and Medium-sized Enterprises, 37 SMALL BUS. ECON. 205, 207 (2011).
168
Colacelli, supra note 9, at annex 1.
169
Kuroda, supra note 96, at 261.
170
See KLAPPER & ZAIDI, supra note 34, at 19 (stating that already existing
guarantee scheme provide a read distribution channel for credit).
171
Patrizia Baudino, Public Guarantees for Bank Lending in Response to
the Covid-19 Pandemic, FIN. STABILITY INST. BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS 1 (Apr.
2020), https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsibriefs5.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ6T-KMSE].
172
For an overview of the implemented measures, see Tackling Coronavirus
(COVID-19) Contributing to a Global Effort, OECD (July 15, 2020),
https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/coronavirus-covid-19-smepolicy-responses-04440101/#section-d1e7906 [https://perma.cc/36W6-AKDP];
Tatiana Didier et al., Financing Firms in Hibernation During the COVID-19
Pandemic (WBG, Pol’y Rsch. Working Paper No. 9236, May 1, 2020).
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functionality, and credit flow while continuing to uphold minimum
prudential standards consistent with international standards.173 Key
elements of measures designed to strike the necessary balance
between effective responses and requisite prudence include defining
targeted beneficiaries, loan terms, and duration of the program.174
Setting a finite duration can limit market distortions when the
programs end.175 Similar calls and counterbalancing measures with
respect to the use of guarantee schemes are noticeably absent.
Credit guarantees deployed during the COVID-19 pandemic
have been more generous. A relatively large proportion of these
programs cover 100% of any loss sustained by the lender.176 Some
programs, including those in Canada and the United States, offer
(partial) loan forgiveness for meeting program targets, such as using
the loan to pay employee salaries. The United States Paycheck
Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act allocated 321
billion USD for forgivable loans and guarantees to help small
businesses retain workers.177 In a complimentary program, the Main
Street Business Lending Program (MSLP), the United States
Treasury invested 75 billion USD in a special purpose vehicle,
established by the Federal Reserve to guarantee 95% of the par value
of loans under the MSLP.178
Over the decades, the Japanese Credit Supplementation
System has been deployed to tackle the economic downturns caused
by several crises. During the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, as
well as the Asian credit crisis of the 1990s, the government utilized
credit guarantees to support SMEs through the Special Credit
173

See Id. at 1, 2; IMF, COVID-19: The Regulatory and Supervisory
Implications for the Banking Sector (Joint IMF-World Bank Staff Position Note,
May 2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33793
[https://perma.cc/7XTA-MVHQ].
174
Baudino, supra note 171, at 1–2.
175
Id. at 5.
176
See Id. tbl. 1, at 2 (noting that Hong Kong introduced low-interest loans
for SMEs with 100%government guarantee (HK$50 billion), and Germany
expanded guaranteed loans for companies and credit insurers, including 100%
guarantees for some loans, increasing the total volume by at least €757 billion
(24%of GDP)).
177
See IMF, Policy Responses to COVID-19,
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19
[https://perma.cc/TW7G-CFMP] (last visited Oct. 22, 2020).
178
Baudino, supra note 171, at 6.
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Guarantee Program for Financial Stability.179 A report published by
the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency acknowledged the
important role the Credit Supplementation System plays to support
the financing of SMEs, particularly in times of crisis.180 However,
the crisis program was characterized by lenient qualification
conditions as a result of which, only a few applications were
rejected. 181
Furthermore, this policy incentivized financial
institutions to restructure the unguaranteed loans as guaranteed loans.
This practice is now prohibited by the contract between CGCs and
financial institutions. 182 Thus, the program has not resulted in
channeling of new credit to SMEs, and increased the moral hazard.183
Guarantee programs implemented post the 1998 Asian crisis
have been equally ineffective. For instance, the Special Guarantee
Program for Financial Stability increased the availability of credit,
but it suppressed profitability of borrowers.184 After the nation’s badloan problem in the 1990s, FSA was established in 1998 under the
Ministry of Finance Banking Bureau to administer rule-based strict
policy. However, this policy led to homogenization of Japanese
financial institutions 185 and reinforcement of their reliance on
guarantees. In October 2008, a guarantee scheme to support SMEs
affected by inflationary movements in the price of raw materials and
the recession triggered by the global financial crisis was
established.186 Later, the scheme was expanded to the Emergency
Guarantee System providing a financial safety net. The total
utilization of the system reached over 27 trillion JPY in March 2011
when it ended.187 Another example of addressing a problem caused
179

Kuroda, supra note 96, at 247.
See SME Credit Supplement System, supra note 37.
181
Uesugi, supra note 49, at 460.
182
The Agreement on the Credit Guarantee Corporation Transaction, art. 3.
183
Hashimoto et al., supra note 71, at 15.
184
See Uesugi, supra note 49, at 460 (stating that one of the reasons was the
moral hazard effect exacerbated by the non-existent collateral requirements).
185
Hashimoto et al., supra note 71, at 15.
186
SME Financing Measures Such as the Creation of an Emergency
Guarantee for Economic Response, SMALL & MEDIUM ENTER. AGENCY (Feb. 5,
2010), https://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/kinyu/2010/100205KeikiSupport.htm
[https://perma.cc/4UAY-FADX].
187
Kaori Nakano & Shinsuke Nakanishi, Lehman Shock Gono Chushokigyo
Kinyusiensaku—Chushokigyou Kinyuenkatukahou To Kinkyuhoshou Seido
[Policy to Support SME Financing after the Global Financial Crisis—SME
180
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by an unpredictable event was the scheme implemented in the
aftermath of the great earthquake in March 2011. The scheme
supported around 3 trillion JPY of business loans.188 In April 2018,
the Crisis-related Guarantee Scheme was established.189 In March
2020, SMEs suffering from the COVID-19 pandemic were listed as
eligible.190
In the second supplementary budget proposal for the 2020
fiscal year, 12 trillion JPY is proposed to be allocated to strengthen
business cash flows as a countermeasure to the COVID-19 effects.191
Three trillion JPY will be invested in financing support through
private financial institutions, including for credit guarantees and
credit insurance.192 There is a wide range of support available for
SMEs affected by COVID-19, including safety net guarantees No. 4
and No. 5, and the Crisis-related Guarantee Scheme. The Tokyo
CGC reported that the amount of guarantees issued from April to
August 2020 was 21 trillion JPY. 193 This exceeds the amount of

Finance Facilitation Act and Emergency Guarantee System], 337 RIPPOU TO
CHOUSA 62 (2013).
188
RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY, Fukkou no Torikumi to Shoseido [Efforts to
Reconstruction and Systems], https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/maincat7/sub-cat7-2/20190703_sanko2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J6X-3GD9] (last visited
Oct. 24, 2020).
189
See Kiki Kanren Hoshou Seido [Guarantee System Related to
Emergency], SMALL & MEDIUM ENTER. AGENCY,
https://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/kinyu/sefu_net_crisis.htm
[https://perma.cc/3MTN-9VDS] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
190
Singata Corna Virus Kansensho ni Kakaru Chushokigyosha Taisaku wo
Koujimasu [We are Implementing Support to SMEs Regarding the Situation of
COVID-19], MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUS. (METI),
https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2019/03/20200311007/20200311007.html
[https://perma.cc/L87N-ZG8T] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
191
Id.
192
Reiwa2nendo Dai2ji Hoseiyosan no Jigyou Gaiyou [Brief Introduction of
2nd Supplementary Budget for FY 2020], MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUS.
(METI),
https://www.meti.go.jp/main/yosan/yosan_fy2020/hosei/pdf/hosei2_yosan_pr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4BDA-BPEY] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
193
Shinyouhoshou Jisseki no suii [Transition in Credit Guarantee Issuance],
JAPAN FED. CREDIT GUAR. CORPS.,
https://www.zenshinhoren.or.jp/document/hosho_jisseki.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U26Z-QPP9] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
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guarantees issued in the fiscal year in the aftermath of the global
financial crisis.
Thus, the credit guarantee system plays an extremely
important role as public policy to support SMEs in a crisis where
swift government support is needed. These functions and features of
guarantees in a crisis differ from guarantees issued in ordinary times.
The following table compares guarantees used in ordinary times with
guarantees during crises.
Ordinary Times
Guarante
e without
collateral

Guarante
e with
collateral

Target

―

―

Use of
funds

―

―

80%

80%

0.45%
~1.90%
dependin
g on the
risk
80

0.45%
~1.90%
dependin
g on the
risk
200

Guarantee
coverage
Guarantee
fee

Maximum
Amount
Guarantee
d (million
JPY)

V.

Crisis
Safety
Net
Guarante
e No.4
SMEs
affected
by
regional
disasters
To
stabilize
their
business
100%

Safety Net
Guarantee
No.5
SMEs
whose
business
classificatio
n
deteriorates
To stabilize
their
business
80%

Crisis
Related
Guarante
e
SMEs
affected
by a great
economic
shock or
disaster
To
stabilize
their
business
100%

below
1%

below 1%

below
0.8%

280

280

280

EFFECTS OF GUARANTEES

Public guarantees cause various macroeconomic and
microeconomic effects. Some studies identified tax revenue and
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maintaining employment as positive macroeconomic effects. 194
Others found growth in assets, sales and employment.195 In contrast,
the OECD has identified a number of market distortions that the use
of credit guarantees may generate. These include (i) channeling of
funds to unproductive borrowers;196 (ii) prolonging the existence of
(zombie) companies that should be liquidated;197 (iii) preventing the
diversification of various financing sources; 198 (iv) disadvantaging
companies that are ineligible to access credit guarantees; and (v)
creating contingent fiscal liabilities.199
The design of the Japanese Credit Supplementation System is
prone to creating these negative effects. The OECD found that it
hinders market-based financing, creates disincentives to grow, and
delays restructuring of viable businesses. 200 Studies by local
commentators found that SMEs that benefit from guaranteed loans
experience declines in their financial performance, and the asset
composition of guarantee beneficiaries changes very little, which

194
See Chatzouz et al., supra note 93, at 11 (noting that in the United States,
the SBA program benefitted employment in low-income areas only); Craig et al.,
supra note 1, at 346, 357 (describing this impact as significantly higher in markets
with small businesses owned by minorities); Ben R. Craig et al., Small Firm
Credit Market Discrimination, Small Business Administration Guaranteed
Lending, and Local Market Economic Performance, 613 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. SOC. SCI. 73 (2007) (advancing research on minority entrepreneurship).
195
A study of the EU market found that within two years after receipt of a
guaranteed loan, the growth of SME beneficiaries exceeded those whose loans
were not guaranteed in a number of metrics: assets by 19.6%, sales by 14.8% and
employment by 16.9%. Fabio Bertoni et al., Econometric Study on the Impact of
EU Loan Guarantee Financial Instruments on Growth and Jobs of SMEs 9 (Eur.
Inv. Fund Working Paper No. 2019/54, 2019).
196
In Chile, guarantees increase delinquency rates by 1.5% within the first
12 months, and by 2% within 24 months as compared to unguaranteed loans.
Kevin Cowan et al., The Effect of Credit Guarantees on Credit Availability and
Delinquency Rates, 59 J. BANKING & FIN. 1, 3 (2015).
197
See Commission Notice, supra note 123, at §2.2.
198
See also USAID, FROM LAWS TO LOANS, supra note 19, at 37.
199
Evaluating Publicly Supported Credit Guarantee Programmes for SMEs,
OECD, at 9 (2017).
200
Randall S. Jones & Myungkyoo Kim, Promoting the Financing of SME’s
and Start-ups in Korea 12 (OECD Econ. Dep’t Working Papers No. 1162, Sept.
16, 2014), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/promoting-the-financing-ofsmes-and-start-ups-in-korea_5jxx054bdlvh-en [https://perma.cc/3HGA-AG5K].
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suggests that guaranteed loans may be used to fund operating
losses.201
Businesses with great potential that may be informationally
opaque are unable to access guaranteed loans. Guarantee schemes
have a tendency to support businesses with negative growth prospects,
as long as they have a history of benefitting from guarantees.202 The
continued availability of a guarantee, in its present structure, does not
provide sufficient economic incentives to liquidate or restructure a
struggling borrower and revive its business prospects. The lending
bank is incentivized to preserve the relationship it has built with the
borrower, which liquidation would effectively terminate. The CGC
and JFC are public entities whose mission may be questioned if an
increasing number of Japanese SMEs were liquidated. Accordingly,
the incentive structure is designed for the CGC and JFC to be
reluctant to force liquidation of unviable borrowers.
Japanese borrowers who secured the repayment of their loans
with some collateral experience larger increases in profitability and
improvement in their risk profile.203 The 2018 JFC Annual Report
includes a story recounted by the honorary chairman of Kyocera
Corporation, now a company publicly traded on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. Forty years ago, a local branch of JFC extended a loan to
Kyocera secured with the machinery it was planning to buy in the
future. 204 This loan enabled Kyocera to grow its business to its
present size. This is a good illustration of the economic effect of
lending secured with commercial collateral that the Credit
Supplementation System used to enable.

201

See Imai, supra note 52, at, 13. See also Uesugi et al., supra note 49, at
458, 479.
202
See Jae Won Kang & Almas Heshmati, Effect of Credit Guarantee
Policy on Survival and Performance of SMEs in Republic of Korea, 31 SMALL
BUS. ECON. 445, 451-58 (2008); Atsushi Kakinuma & Shinsuke Nakanishi, Zaisei
Futan no Shiten kara Mita Shinyou Hoshou ni Kansuru Ichi Kousatu
[Consideration on Credit Guarantee Regarding the Public Financial Burden],
KEIZAI NO PRISM 114, 140 (2013).
203
See Arito Ono et al., The Effects of Collateral on Firm Performance, 26
J. JAPANESE INT’L ECON. 84, 84–85 (2012) (describing how the lack of collateral
reduces the incentive of the borrower to operate its business in the most efficient
manner, and encourages asset substitution and dissipation); Ono et al., supra note
49, at 154.
204
See JFC, supra note 98, at 50.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss3/1

418

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 16

A 2016 report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
contends that:
in practical terms guarantees are not a substitute for
being able to secure loans against collateral. All the
problems with unsecured lending exist with
guarantees. All that a guarantee does is shift the risk,
or some percentage of the risk, from the primary
lenders, the banks, to the guarantors. . . . There is
simply no substitute for reform of secured transactions
systems if financial markets are to adequately fund
small and medium sized businesses.205
Borrowers and Lenders
The availability and low cost of credit guarantees do not make
market-based financing an economically attractive alternative in
Japan.206 Even though market-based financing produces a number of
positives for borrowers, the incentive structure steers them to
guaranteed lending. Furthermore, the incentive structure locks in the
SME borrower within the Credit Supplementation System. Put
simply, business growth punishes the borrower because outgrowing
its SME status makes it ineligible to participate in a guarantee scheme.
Lenders have an incentive to preserve the SME status of their
borrowers so as not to lose the benefit of the guarantee, without which
lending becomes riskier.207 This distortion is one of the failures of
size-dependent policies in Japan.208
The statistics on the use of credit guarantees illustrate these
failures. Figure 7 documents that 95.6% of all guaranteed loans are
under 80 million JPY, which is the maximum amount eligible for JFC
insurance for loans that do not require any collateral. Figure 8
illustrates that 93.7% of all guaranteed loans are used for working

205

ASIAN DEV. BANK, CREDIT GUARANTEES: CHALLENGING THEIR ROLE IN
IMPROVING ACCESS TO FINANCE IN THE PACIFIC REGION 9 (2016).
206
Ono, Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees, supra note 67, at 942.
207
Daisuke Tsuruta, SME Policies as a Barrier to Growth of SMEs, 54
SMALL BUS. ECON 1067, 1076 (2020).
208
Id. at 1072, 1100.
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capital rather than investment.209 Accordingly, lenders extend loans
that fall under the maximum that does not require taking any
collateral, and borrowers use the loan proceeds to essentially
maintain and preserve their business.
Figure 7: The Amount of Guaranteed
Loan

Figure 8: Usage of the Guaranteed
Loan

While the guarantee scheme does not require lenders to ease
the requirements to take collateral, guarantees result in lower
collateral requirements. The use of collateral for lending is
predicated on the ability of the lender to administer the loan as well
as value and monitor the collateral. The Bank of Japan highlighted
that the risk management for loans to middle-risk businesses in Japan
must be strengthened.210 Inadequate practices and skills of this nature
are also characteristic for CGCs and JFC.211 If the risk of the lender
is 100% covered by a guarantee, even if the loan is secured by
209
See JAPAN FED’N CREDIT GUAR. CORPS., Heisei 30 Nendo Sinyou
Hoshou Riyoujoukyo [Usage of Credit Guarantee in FY2018],
http://www.zenshinhoren.or.jp/document/riyo_jyokyo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U5XU-YP42] (last visited Oct. 24 2020).
210
BANK OF JAPAN, supra note 54, at 84.
211
The JFC does not perform any due diligence on the borrowers whose
loans are guaranteed by the CGC, but does so for the loans it directly extends. In
the former case, the CGC and the lender assess the creditworthiness of the loan
applicant.
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collateral, the incentives to build capacity to administer and monitor
such loans are reduced.212 This incentive is further reduced by the
policy of CGCs that requires the application of less strict valuation
methods when some collateral is taken.213
The design of the Japanese guarantee scheme disincentivizes
the building of skills necessary to administer secured loans and halts
the transition to market-based financing. The other major effect is to
perpetuate the existence of zombie companies. The 2013 Japan
Revitalization Strategy set a goal to increase the percentage of nonviable firms that should be liquidated and entry of new firms from 4–
5% (it was below 4% in 2012) to 10%.214 If a loan is guaranteed and
restructuring has no effect on the continuation of the guarantee
coverage, lenders have an economic incentive to inject liquidity into
a zombie company that should have been liquidated. If the loan is
not guaranteed, there is more of an incentive to provide debt
forgiveness. Japanese lenders do not have an economic incentive to
forgive the debt on which its potential losses are 80% or 100%
guaranteed.215 It has been documented that the financial performance
of borrowers whose indebtedness has been forgiven is superior as
compared to those who receive an extension of the guaranteed loan.
For those companies remaining in the guarantee scheme, leverage

212

See Le Ngoc Dang & Anh Tu Chuc, Challenges in Implementing the
Credit Guarantee Scheme for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: The Case of
Viet Nam 14 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 941, 2019); Commission
Notice, supra note 123, at § 3.2(c). See also Arito Ono, Chushokigyo Muke
Kashidasi wo Meguru Jishoubunseki: Genjou to Tenbou [Empirical Analysis on
SME Lending: Present and Prospect], 30 KIN’YU KENKYU (2011) (describing
how the financial institution may still bear the borrower’s credit risk when it has
extended multiple loans to that same borrower); Ono & Uesugi, supra note 67, at
935, 943.
213
For receivables, CGC requires establishment of their value by applying a
percentage that varies from 70% to 100% of average monthly sales that generate
the receivables. For inventories, the book value can be used. Based on this
evaluation, the applicable loan amount is 30% of the asset value. The weight can
be increased from 30% to 70%, such as when the asset’s value is objectively
established by a third party. See JAPAN FED’N CREDIT GUAR. CORPS.,
HOSHOUTSUKI YUSHI TORIATUKAI Q&A [HOW TO TREAT GUARANTEED LOANS
Q&A] 232 (2011).
214
See also Jones & Jin, supra note 62, at 11; Colacelli & Hong, supra note
9, at 9.
215
Ono & Yasuda, supra note 30, at 5.
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increases, credit profiles deteriorate, and number of employees
declines.216
Realignment of the Incentives
Lenders and borrowers have ample incentives to participate
in the Credit Supplementation System. Those are reinforced not only
by the overall risk transfer to the guarantee scheme, but also the types
of obligations that lenders must perform to claim protection.
Examination of agreements between the CGC and lenders reveals that
the agreements are not set up to induce lenders to build capacity to
administer commercial loans.217 Several examples will illustrate.
The lender is required to proceed with due diligence, in
accordance with the agreement it signs with the CGC.218 In case of a
deterioration of the credit facility or impending default, it would
ordinarily inform the CGC and take any steps necessary to preserve
recourse against the borrower. After making a payment to the lender
and subrogation to its rights, the CGC would pursue the borrower.
The outstanding obligation owed by the borrower typically includes
any amount the CGC paid on the guarantee, costs of enforcement, and
damages for the breach of the agreement. Since the guarantee
generally covers 80% of the outstanding amount of the obligation, the
216

Id. at 4.
The Agreement on the Credit Guarantee Corporation Transaction is on
file with the authors.
218
Financial institutions are required to exercise the due diligence necessary
to ensure the satisfaction of the credit guaranteed obligation under The Agreement
on the Credit Guarantee Corporation Transaction, art. 9. However, some research
pointed out that the vagueness of the contract is resulting in the failure to exercise
proper due diligence and monitoring by the financial institutions. For further
information, see Shunkichi Tsurui & Masayoshi Hirano, Shinyou Hosho Kyoukai
Torihihiki no Houteki Saikousei (1)—21 Seiki heno Kinyu Henkaku no Nakadeno
Kouteki Hoshou Kikan Torihiki to Kongo [Reconstructing a Framework of Legal
Aspects of Transactions with Public Guarantee Organizations (1)—Transactions
with Public Organizations amid the Deregulation on Japanese Banking Industry—
Designing a Desirable Future Framework], Komazawa Hougaku 9, 262–215
(2009); Shunkichi Tsurui & Masayoshi Hirano, Shinyou Hosho Kyoukai Torhihiki
no Houteki Saikousei (2)—21 Seiki heno Kinyu Henkaku no Nakadeno Kouteki
Hoshou Kikan Torihiki to Kongo [Reconstructing a Framework of Legal Aspects
of transactions with public guarantee organizations ⑴—Transactions with Public
Organizations amid the Deregulation on Japanese Banking Industry—Designing a
Desirable Future Framework], Komazawa Hougaku 9(2), 200–89 (2009).
217
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lender is expected to enforce its rights against the borrower for the
deficiency. Accordingly, the borrower may be subject to two
competing enforcement actions—CGC’s for the 80% of the
outstanding amount it paid to the lender and the 20% of the
outstanding amount, which represents the lender’s deficiency. The
borrower may not have sufficient assets to satisfy both claims, in
which case their priority will matter. In the absence of a specific
clause in an agreement between the CGC and the lender as to the
priority of their respective claims, the ordinary first-in-time, first-inright principle would apply. Accordingly, the deficiency claim of the
lender would be satisfied in priority that further distorts its incentives
in administering the loan. One way in which the enhancement of
practices of lenders may be induced is for the JFC and CGCs to
consider including subordination clauses in their agreements with
that would subordinate the deficiency claims of lenders to the
enforcement of subrogation rights of the issuers of guarantees to the
extent of the proportional sharing of the loss 80/20%.
Another example is the CGCs’ right to refuse the payment on
a guarantee. The effectiveness of the “exemption clause” that allows
the CGC to reject a claim for the payment of a guarantee was
addressed by the Supreme Court of Japan in its (Ju) 1351 of 2014
decision. 219 In that case, the lender failed to conduct proper due
diligence on the personal guarantor of the loan who served as the
director of the company borrower. The Supreme Court held that a
lender that failed to investigate whether the undertaking of the
director will be valid and enforceable amounts to a breach of the
guarantee agreement that exempts the CGC from paying the
guaranteed amount. In another case, the Supreme Court held that
CGC guarantees may not be used to satisfy the borrower’s other
indebtedness to the lender.220 The lender applied the sum paid by the
CGC first to an unsecured overdraft and then the remainder on the
actual loan that was guaranteed. The Supreme Court held that such
use of the guarantee is contrary to its purpose, and breach of a clause
in a contract between the CGC and the lender that precludes

219

Minshu Vol. 70, No. 1.
The Agreement on the Credit Guarantee Corporation Transaction, art. 3.
See JAPAN FED’N CREDIT GUAR. CORPS., supra note 103, at 278–79.
220
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“replacement of old loans with new guaranteed loans.” 221 Such a
breach would partially extinguish the liability of the CGC to pay the
guaranteed sum corresponding to the breach. Thus, the lender may
still claim a payment from the CGC for the amount that corresponds
to the outstanding obligation of the borrower on the guaranteed loan
that is less of an incentive to exercise due diligence.
Notably, CGC rejections of claims on the guarantees by
lenders are extremely rare. The Supreme Court decisions protect the
CGC against lapses of lenders that ordinarily should not occur. The
narrow grounds that would entitle the CGC to refuse a claim reinforce
the lax attitude of financial institutions towards doing due diligence
on prospective borrowers.
The lender may expect to be paid if it merely acts in good faith,
and what elsewhere may fall short of commercially reasonable
conduct. 222 The conditions and minimal grounds for refusing to
honor a guarantee set out in agreements with the CGC inevitably
impact lending practices. As a condition of participation in the Credit
Supplementation System, lenders should be required to issue,
administer, and liquidate guaranteed loans consistent with prudent
lending standards. The Agreement on the Credit Guarantee
Corporation Transaction between the CGC and the financial
institution, specifically articles 9–11, detail the protection and
collection of guaranteed obligations including provision of collateral
and exemption from responsibility.223 However, the guideline is not
as detailed as the guidelines issued in the United States by the SBA
with respect to servicing loans and liquidating collateral supporting
loans guaranteed by the SBA.224
CGCs may consider issuing more detailed guidelines
identifying certain actions that should be taken by lenders. These
221

Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] OCT. 31, 1997, Hei 19 no. 9. SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 4004.
222
Cf. U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (Am. Law. Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977)
(requiring all aspects of disposition of the collateral to be in a “commercially
reasonable” manner). See also Comm’n Int’l Trade Res. 61/33, at art. 4 (Dec. 4,
2006) (discussing the relationship between knowledge and compliance when
waiving one’s right to object in international arbitration).
223
Credit Guarantee Corporation, Yakujoushorei no Kaisetsu to
Kaishakushishin (art. 9–11) (interpreting guidelines of the agreement on the credit
guarantee corporation transactions).
224
For a sample applicable to U.S. lenders, see OFFICE OF CAPITAL ACCESS,
SBA 50–57-2, 7(A) LOAN SERVICING AND LIQUIDATION (2015),
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guidelines would be particularly desirable for loans secured with
personal property.225 They may relate to administering loans, such as
to require lenders to collect from the borrower information affecting
the business, including any changes in the name and location, whether
of the borrower itself or any personal guarantor, as well as any
financial information material to the operation of the business. But,
also, they may prescribe certain actions to be taken to facilitate
orderly liquidation of the collateral. The CGC may prepare
liquidation plans outlining the steps necessary for lenders to enforce
their rights in the collateral.226 These plans should be incorporated in
the contract between the CGC and financial institutions, which
should also provide for the priority of the CGCs’ deficiency claims.
Upon default, the collateral should be inspected, inventoried and
valued. Lenders should be required to take any necessary actions to
preserve the collateral value, whether prior to or during insolvency.
A liquidation plan for different types of collateral may give lenders
the necessary comfort as well as nudge them toward timely
liquidation of zombie companies rather than preserving their
existence. The CGC should be released from liability on a guarantee
if the lender has failed to make, close, service, or liquidate a loan in
a prudent manner or if the lender’s improper action or inaction has
exposed the CGC to risk.227
Changes should be considered not only at the contractual but
also at the functional level. The Credit Supplementation System
should consider becoming more of a facilitator of private transactions.
For example, one reason lenders shy away from secured lending is
the challenge of asset valuation. To incentivize lenders to engage in
secured transactions, the CGCs should explore the use of modern
technology to design secondary markets for collateral that would
increase the re-sale value of assets. The CGCs could establish a
digital platform where receivables of large companies may be posted
to enable their financing by interested parties. This mechanism of

225

See Credit Guarantee Corporation, Yakujoushorei no Kaisetsu to
Kaishakushishin (art. 9–11) (interpreting guidelines of the agreement on the credit
guarantee corporation transactions).
226
Office of Capital Access., supra note 224.
227
Cf. 13 C.F.R. § 120.524 (2019) (deatiling the grounds that entitle the
United States Small Business Administration to deny paying on the guarantee it
has issued).
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reverse factoring has been deployed elsewhere by agencies similar to
Japanese CGCs.228

VI.

CONCLUSIONS

State interventions are deployed to address market failures
impacting access to credit. They should not be designed simply for
the purpose of increasing the use of financial services per se.
Furthermore, they should correct the underlying problems in a costeffective and complementary manner to market-based financing.229
Several interventions have had negligible economic impact in Japan’s
history and were discontinued. In contrast, credit guarantees support
about one third of SME credit in Japan. They fulfill various policy
goals, including stability of the labor market. Any reconfiguration of
the Japanese credit market toward market-based financing must take
into account the enormous economic significance of the guarantee
scheme, its role during crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic,
and its foothold in various facets of the economy.
The policy underpinning a guarantee scheme should not be to
increase the amount of finance but to facilitate the use of finance in a
more productive manner. This effect has been lacking in Japan. The
OECD recommended shifting the focus from providing a safety net
for borrowers, particularly those negatively affected by a (financial)
crisis, including COVID-19 pandemic, to efficient market-based
financing that, among others, facilitates restructuring of struggling
businesses.230 This shift should be accompanied by increasing the
availability of financing instruments to SMEs. Transition to marketbased financing is expected to increase the productivity and growth
of SMEs, and facilitate the exit of economically unviable companies.
Various Japanese agencies highlighted that borrowers should
“graduate” from credit guarantees, recommending prioritization of
support for conventional bank loans.
The guarantee scheme in Japan should consider some
modifications to assist the development of market-based secured
financing. First, some evidence of inability to obtain an unguaranteed
228

See eg., DE LA TORRE ET AL., supra note 16, at 147–65 (describing the
impact of such practices in Mexico).
229
Id. at 164.
230
See COVID-19 GOVERNMENT FINANCING SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR
BUSINESSES, OCED 15 (2020).
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loan may be required. If the prospective borrower already meets the
lender’s standard criteria for a market-based loan, a guarantee is
unjustified. JFC and CGCs may consider requiring some evidence of
the prospective borrower not being able to satisfy those criteria as a
condition of issuing the guarantee. This would enable the
policymakers to also assess the financial additionality effect of the
scheme.231 Second, a business may be entitled to access a guaranteed
loan only one time, unless it has demonstrated growth in productivity
while it remains unable to obtain a loan not supported through the
Credit Supplementation System. Third, access to guarantees may be
limited primarily to those borrowers who have not established a
relationship with a financial institution, such as start-ups.232 Fourth,
guarantees may be used side-by-side with security interests in
movable assets, but designed to gradually facilitate the transition to
secured loans for which a guarantee is unnecessary. Such collateral
should not be limited to inventory and receivables, which are the only
types that currently qualify as liquid assets in Japan, but also include
equipment and intellectual property rights. Fifth, in exchange for
restructuring the guaranteed loan, the borrower should provide
additional collateral. An extension of a credit guarantee sustains the
existence of unproductive zombie companies. Sixth, the value of
collateral securing the loan may translate into a reduction in the fee
for the issuance of a guarantee. Finally, a higher fee may be imposed
on the lender that has a track record of extending loans with a high
default rate.
The Credit Supplementation System should promote a credit
culture in which lenders develop prudent lending practices and
maintain relationships with borrowers. This would directly address
the inadequate risk assessment capacity of Japanese lenders. Without
such capacity being sufficiently developed, an increase in asset-based
lending should not be expected. However, all of these changes will
have the desired economic effect only if the secured transactions
framework is aligned with the international principles. An effort to
reform that framework is ongoing, and the recovery from the
COVID-19 pandemic presents an opportunity to redefine the role of
231

See Abraham & Schmukler, supra note 31 (noting that the financial
additionality measures increase in access to credit and improved lending
conditions).
232
Ono et al., supra note 49, at 166.
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the Credit Supplementation System in enabling market-based
financing.
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